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THE MONTY PYTHON LITIGATION-OF MORAL
RIGHT AND THE LANHAM ACT*
For two years the collection of British humorists known
as Monty Python has successfully brought to the United States
an idiosyncratic brand of comedy through weekly television
programs. Monty Python now appears to have hastened the
recognition in American law of a distinctly continental legal
postulate. In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.,' the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an author or artist
may seek redress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Trade-
mark Act2 for the publication of his creation in a mutilated
form. The decision thereby vindicated an author's interest in
maintaining the integrity of his work-an interest that, as the
court recognized, derives neither from copyright nor from con-
tract law but from the European doctrine of droit moral, or
"moral right."
Monty Python writes and performs scripts for initial tele-
vision broadcast by the British Broadcasting Company (BBC). A
scriptwriters' agreement strictly limits the extent to which BBC
may work "script alterations" on the material submitted by
Monty Python.3 BBC licensed Time-Life Films to distribute the
* This paper was written for the University of Pennylvania Law Review, and is being
submitted in the 1977 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition sponsored by the Amer-
ican Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
' 538 F.2d 14, 17 n.2 (2d Cir. 1976). The Agreement provides:
When script alterations are necessary it is the intention of the BBC to
make every effort to inform and to reach agreement with the Writer. When-
ever practicable any necessary alterations (other than minor alterations) shall
be made by the Writer. Nevertheless the BBC shall at all times have the right
to make (a) minor alterations and (b) such other alterations as in its opinion
are necessary in order to avoid involving the BBC in legal action or bringing
the BBC into disrepute. Any decision under (b) shall be made at a level not
below that of Head of Department. It is however agreed that after a script
has been accepted by the BBC alterations will not be made by the BBC under
(b) above unless (i) the Writer, if available when the BBC requires the altera-
tions to be made, has been asked to agree to them but is not willing to do so
and (ii) the Writer has had, if he so requests and if the BBC agrees that time
permits if rehearsals and recording are to proceed as planned, an opportunity
to be represented by the Writers' Guild of Great Britain (or if he is not a mem-
ber of the Guild by his agent) at a meeting with the BBC to be held within at
most 48 hours of the request (excluding weekends). If in such circumstances
there is no agreement about the alterations then the final decision shall rest
with the BBC. Apart from the right to make alterations under (a) and (b)
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recorded Monty Python programs in the United States, and
permitted Time-Life Films to edit "for insertion of commercials,
applicable censorship or governmental . . . rules and regula-
tions, and National Association of Broadcasters and time seg-
ment requirements. ' 4 Time-Life Films in turn licensed some of
the programs to American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC),
and agreed that the programs would "be edited and otherwise
made to fully conform to the policies of ABC's Department of
Broadcast Standards and Practices . . . ."5 By this chain of trans-
actions, the carefully restricted editing rights yielded by the
scriptwriters became a broad license for cutting by the ultimate
broadcaster. On October 3, 1975, ABC broadcast a ninety-
minute Monty Python "special" composed of three thirty-min-
ute programs; ABC had deleted twenty-four minutes of mate-
rial contained in the original programs.
6
Monty Python learned sometime in late November of the
broadcast of their truncated programs, objected to ABC's edit-
ing, and, when ABC refused to cancel a second Monty Python
"special" scheduled for December 26, 1975, sued to enjoin the
second broadcast. The district court, in an unreported opinion,7
found that plaintiffs had been and would be irreparably injured
by ABC's editing of their programs, but the court declined to
enjoin the December 26 broadcast, because ABC would be
harmed more severely by the last-minute cancellation than
Monty Python would be by the broadcast. Judge Lasker instead
granted plaintiffs limited relief by ordering ABC to broadcast
during the second "special" a reasonably worded disclaimer
prepared by Monty Python.8 This order was stayed by the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals, which required only a brief notice
to be broadcast: "Edited for television by ABC."
above the BBC shall not without the consent of the Writer or his agent (which
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld) make any structural alterations
as opposed to minor alterations to the script, provided that such consent shall
not be necessary in any case where the Writer is for any reason not immediately
available for consultation at the time which in the BBC's opinion is the dead-
line from the production point of view for such alterations to be made if re-
hearsals and recording are to proceed as planned.
4 1d. at 18.
Brief for Defendant at 4.
6 538 F.2d at 18. Plaintiff Gilliam testified at the hearing before Judge Lasker and
expressed the basis of Monty Python's objections: "I just wanted to clarify, make clear
what we are thinking about when we talk about the integrity or entity of the show. In
that particular show I think we saw that things were very intricately interwoven. Things
kept referring back to themselves .... " Appeal Record at 92a.
7 Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., No. 75-Civ-6256 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 19,
1975). Judge Lasker's oral opinion is reported in the Appeal Record at 113a-21a.
I Appeal Record, supra note 6, at I 17a.
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The Second Circuit subsequently heard Monty Python's
interlocutory appeal from the denial of injunctive relief, and,
on June 30, 1976, reversed the district court, granting a tempo-
rary injunction forbidding ABC to rebroadcast the edited Monty
Python programs pending disposition of the suit upon plenary
trial. Because at the time of the appeal no rebroadcasts had been
scheduled, the court concluded that ABC would suffer no ir-
reparable injury under such an order; thus, a temporary in-
junction could properly be granted upon a showing that Monty
Python was likely ultimately to succeed on the merits of its
claim.9 In part I of its opinion, the court considered plaintiffs'
copyright infringement claim,10 holding that Monty Python
retained a common law copyright in the unpublished script,"
that the recorded program was a derivative work subject to the
rights retained by authors of the underlying script, that BBC
could not have granted greater rights to use the material than
it possessed, and that therefore the enlargement in editing
rights was a nullity.' 2 In part II of its opinion, the court con-
sidered plaintiffs' argument that ABC's mutilation of their work
transgressed their right to present the programs to the public
in their original form and held that the allegation of such mu-
tilation stated a claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Trade-
mark Act.' 3 The court concluded that Monty Python was likely
9 538 F.2d at 19.
10 Monty Python apparently brought its claim on a copyright theory due to the
difficulty of enforcing a contract against a remote party such as ABC. Had plaintiffs
also stated a contract cause of action, ABC's defense would have been that there is plain-
ly no privity between Monty Python and ABC; this argument would prevail because
New York law requires privity as a condition of a plaintiff's right to sue for breach of
contract. See Ebbe v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc., 286 App. Div. 998, 144 N.Y.S.2d (1955),
aff'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 846, 135 N.E.2d 728, 153 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1956); Atlantic & Pacific
Wire & Gable Co. v. Duberstein Iron & Metal Co., 136 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (per
curiam); Hanssel v. P. Tomasetti Contracting Corp., 8 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per
curiam, 257 App. Div. 1031, 13 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1939), rev'd in part on other grounds, 283
N.Y. 164, 27 N.E.2d 977 (1940).
11 The court raised but did not decide the question whether broadcast of the re-
corded program constituted "publication" of the script such that plaintiffs were divested
of their common law copyright in the script. 538 F.2d at 19-20 n.3. See 1 M. NIMMER,
COPYRIGHT §§ 56.3, 57 (1963 & Supp. 1976).
'1 538 F.2d at 20-21. In addition, the court found that plaintiffs had not ratified
ABC's editing, that BBC was not a joint author with plaintiffs, as plaintiffs clearly had
intended to retain their superior interest in the programs, and that the record at that
stage of the case did not support ABC's claim of an implicit license to edit, based on
industry custom. Id. at 21-23. Finally, the court dismissed defendant's contentions that
plaintiffs were guilty of laches in bringing the action and had failed to join BBC and
Time-Life Films as indispensable parties. Id. at 25-26. See also note 10 supra.
'3 Section 43(a) provides:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designa-
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to prevail on the merits both as to the copyright infringement
claim and as to the Lanham Act claim. Judge Gurfein, in a con-
curring opinion, noted the novel application of the Lanham
Act in a copyright action, and suggested that broadcast of a
notice stating Monty Python's disapproval of the editing might
serve as an adequate remedy.' 4
This Comment will examine the logic employed by the
Gilliam court in reaching the conclusion that section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act may afford a remedy when editing by an artist's
licensee results in a violation of the artist's asserted "moral right"
to preserve the structural integrity of his creation. The Com-
ment will then analyze the court's copyright holding, and con-
clude that the influence of moral right is evident here as well,
although the court was less willing to acknowledge the fact. The
Second Circuit's opinion is noteworthy both for its novel use of
the Lanham Act and for its receptivity to droit moral-a theory
of law that is common in many foreign jurisdictions but has
gained only occasional recognition in this country. The Lanham
Act holding, in particular, is auspicious for authors and artists
as an alternative theory upon which to base claims, outside of
copyright, against improvident alteration of their work by one
who is licensed to exploit the work for profit.' 5
tion of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or
other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause
such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with
knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or rep-
resentation clause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce
or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable
to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated
as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such
false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
14 538 F.2d at 26-27.
ABC's license (granted by Time-Life Films) raised some doubt as to Monty
Python's copyright in the scripts and lent support to ABC's defense of ratification.
See note 12 supra. Moreover, Judge Lasker, while making no mention of plaintiffs' Lan-
ham Act claim, offered the confusion surrounding ownership of copyright in the re-
corded program as one reason for denying the injunction. Appeal Record, supra note
6, at 115a. The Second Circuit, however, made it reasonably clear that the Lanham
Act claim is available "regardless of the right ABC had to broadcast an edited program."
538 F.2d at 23. It was an alternative ground of decision, "outside the statutory law of
copyright." Id. at 24.
Judge Gurfein may have misconceived the issue when he wrote that "this is the
first case in which a federal appellate court has held that there may be a violation of
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act with respect to a common-law copyright," at least if he meant
that the Lanham Act claim would have had to fail had plaintiffs lost their copyright
argument. Id. at 26 (emphasis supplied).
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I. MORAL RIGHT AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
A. The Nature of Moral Right
Droit moral, the artist's bundle of moral rights, comprises
the "paternity" interest, the "integrity" interest, and a number
of subsidiary rights. The paternity interest "is simply the right
of the creator of a work to present himself before the public as
such, to require others so to present him, and to prevent others
from attributing works to him which he has not devised.""I The
integrity interest is the author's right, once a work has been sold
or made public, "to insist that its [structural] integrity must not
be violated by measures which could alter or distort it.' 'i
Among the subsidiary moral rights are (1) the right to rescind
a contract that calls for the creation or publication of a work of
art or literature,18 (2) the right to alter or destroy a completed
work of the artist upon compensation of the present owner, 19
and (3) the right to enjoin or reply to excessive or vexatious
criticism of one's artistic work.2°
Moral rights accrue to the artist, rather than to the work
itself, and are aimed at protecting the measure of his personal-
ity embodied in his creation, rather than the economic potential
of that creation. 2' They are sometimes said to be perpetual and
inalienable.22 Some recognition of moral right may be found in
more than sixty nations.23 A composite of droit moral is codified
in the Berne Copyright Convention, to which the United States
is not a party:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and
even after the transfer of the said rights, the author
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
16 Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 561-62 (1940).
" Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French
Law, 16 Am. J. COMP. L. 465, 480 (1968).
" See Roeder, supra note 16, at 560; Sarraute, supra note 17, at 467-76.
'9 See Sarraute, supra note 17, at 476-78.
2 See Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. 506 (1955), reprinted
in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 109, 122-23 (Comm.
Print 1960).
21 See Roeder, supra note 16, at 561-65; Sarraute, supra note 17. See also 1 R.
CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 3.3, at
87-88 n.24 (3d ed. 1967).
22 See Sarraute, supra note 17, at 478, 483; Statute of Mar. 11, 1957 on Literary
and Artistic Property, No. 57-298, [1957] J.0. 2723, [1957] D.L. 102 (France).
23See Comment, Copyright: Moral Right-A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 793,
797 & n.47 (1975) (collecting statutes).
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and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation
to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.2 4
B. The Anglo-American Experience
Moral rights of the artist-either recognized as such or im-
plied in decisions standing on no other ground-have received
fleeting acceptance by courts in the United States and Great
Britain 25 and, when recognized, arise apart from any copyright
protection or contractual provision.26 Other courts, however,
have steadfastly refused to "import" moral rights into Ameri-
can law. 27 The moral rights of paternity and integrity have more
24 Berne Copyright Convention, Paris Revision, July 24, 1971, Art. 6bis (1), re-
printed in 7 COPYRIGHT 135, 137 (1971). The conditions and procedures for protection
of these rights are reserved to the laws of the signatories. Id., Art. 6bis (2), (3). See, e.g.,
Statute of Mar. 11, 1957 on Literary and Artistic Property, Art. 6, No. 57-298 [1957] J.O.
2723, [1957] D.L. 102 (France); Law of Sept. 9, 1965, Nr. 51, Arts. 12-14, BGB1 1274-75
(German Federal Republic).
25 [We are not required] to consider the sale of the rights to a literary
production in the same way that we would consider the sale of a barrel of
pork .... While an author may write to earn his living ... yet the purchaser,
in the absence of a contract which permits him so to do, cannot make as free a
use of them as he could of the pork which he purchased .... The purchaser
cannot garble it or put it out under another name than the author's ....
Clemens v. Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 184, 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207-08 (Sup. CL
1910) (Seabury, J., concurring). See, e.g., Drummond v. Altemus, 60 F. 338 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1894) (granting preliminary injunction against publication of plaintiff's public
domain lectures in an edited, garbled format but still attributed to plaintiff); Archbold
v. Sweet, 174 Eng. Rep. 55 (K.B. 1832) (author of law treatise may recover for defendant
publisher's garbling of revised edition attributed to plaintiff, even when defendant
owned copyright in the work); Lord Byron v. Johnston, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (Ch. 1816)
(granting injunction against sale by defendant of poems attributed to, but not authored
by, plaintiff).
26 See, e.g., Drummond v. Altemus, 60 F. 338, 338-39 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1894):
The subject of copyright is not directly involved. The complainant does not
base his claim to relief upon the statute, but upon his right, quite distinct from
any conferred by copyright, to protection against having any literary matter
published as his work which is not actually his creation, and, incidentally, to
prevent fraud upon purchasers. That such right exists is too well settled, upon
reason and authority, to require demonstration ....
In fact, the existence of such a right, at least in Anglo-American jurisprudence, was too
novel to permit demonstration.
217 "What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law in this country to conform
to that of certain other countries .-. . . [W]e are not disposed to make any new law in
this respect." Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (plaintiff artist
will not be heard to complain of defendant magazine's publication of plaintiff's draw-
ings without attribution, when plaintiff has sold rights to the work to defendant); see
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
See also Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 383, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct.
1957), aff'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 475, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960).
The disdain in the common law jurisdictions for authors' remedies apart from
616
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often won acceptance in this country when presented in the
guise of more familiar doctrines such as libel, rights ex contractu,
unfair competition, and the rights of privacy and publicity than
when urged as independent common law rights.
28
1. Libel
Although authors have succeeded in enforcing under a
libel theory their paternity right to be free from the false at-
tribution of authorship of another's work,29 droit moral speaks to
interests distinct from those protected by libel law. The person-
ality of the artist, as opposed to his exploitable reputation, and
the act of creation, as opposed to the mercenary appurtenances
to that act, are the concerns of moral right.30 Thus, it has been
suggested in the past that the scurrilous attribution of a poorly
written story to a renowned author would not be per se libel.31
Such an attribution, however, probably would transgress droit
moral.3 2 Other acts that violate the paternity interest have with-
stood allegations of libel when the author has failed to plead and
prove special damages.33 Moreover, a recent decision established
that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act may serve to vindicate an
copyright appears to reflect the influence of Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837
(H.L. 1774), which held the original British copyright statute, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709), to
be in derogation of underlying perpetual common law rights in a work. See Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (establishing the principle in the United States). It has
recently been argued that Donaldson did not litigate the full scope of an author's extra-
copyright interests and therefore should not be taken as authority for the proposition
that the copyright statute preempts extrastatutory moral rights. Comment, supra note
23, at 807 n.136.
28 See, e.g., Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 383, 387, 162 N.Y.S.2d
770, 774 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 475, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960); Com-
ment, supra note 23, at 812. See also Strauss, supra note 20, at 142.
29 See, e.g., Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432 (1929);
D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N.Y.S. 200, modified, 208
N.Y. 695, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913). The ability of authors to vindicate their paternity in-
terests through common law libel actions may have been diminished by Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), which imposed on the states a requirement that fault
and actual injury be established to recover for defamatory falsehood.
30 See note 21 supra & accompanying text.
3 D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453, 456, 139 N.Y.S. 200,
203 (Scott, J., dissenting), modified, 208 N.Y. 695, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913), cf. Harris v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (not per se
libel for producer to credit plaintiff only with "Story Research" although plaintiff wrote
script of motion picture); Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (Sup. Ct.
1937), aff'd, 253 App. Div. 887, 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1938) (libel claim seeking to vindicate
paternity and integrity interests in broadcast scripts dismissed for failure to prove
special damages). But see Carroll v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 3 F.R.D. 95 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); Gershwin v. Ethical Publishing Co., 166 Misc. 39, 1 N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. City Ct.
1937).
32 See Roeder, supra note 16, at 562; Strauss, supra note 20, at 116-17 nn.5, 8 & 14.
13 See, e.g., Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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artist's paternity interest in a case in which a libel claim would
failY4
2. The Rights of Privacy and Publicity
Privacy and publicity rights have also been invoked to ap-
proximate droit moral, but neither theory provides protection
comparable to that available under section 43(a). Two recent ac-
tions under the New York privacy statute35 sought to vindicate,
respectively, the artist's rights against misappropriation and
mislabeling of a creative product; in each case, the court found a
violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and rejected the
statutory privacy claim. 6 In one case the privacy action failed
because the artist had distributed his work under a pseudonym,
which is not a protectable "name" within the meaning of the
New York statute.3 7 In the second case, defendant record com-
34 See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 351, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
By the time of trial, the Lanham Act violation had been corrected by defendants pur-
suant to an injunction obtained in Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
3 N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1948):
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent
first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the su-
preme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using his
name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may
also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use
and if the defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait
or picture in such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by the last
section, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages. But nothing
contained in this act shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or
corporation, practicing the profession of photography, from exhibiting in or
about his or its establishment specimens of the work of such establishment,
unless the same is continued by such person, firm or corporation after written
notice objecting thereto has been given by the person portrayed; and nothing
contained in this act shall be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or
corporation from using the name, portrait or picture of any manufacturer or
dealer in connection with the goods, wares and merchandise manufactured,
produced or dealt in by him which he has sold or disposed of with such name,
portrait or picture used in connection therewith; or from using the name,
portrait or picture of any author, composer or artist in connection with his
literary, musical or artistic productions which he has sold or disposed of with
such name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith.
Two other jurisdictions have enacted similar statutes. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-405
to 406 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE § 8-650 (1957).
" Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Yameta Co.
v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), vacated and remanded
per curiam, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 208
N.Y. 695, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913) (dismissing count under New York privacy statute).
" Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). An
earlier opinion in the same case found plaintiff's use of a pseudonym not to bar re-
covery under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp.
261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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pany successfully relied on the statutory exemption permitting
any person to use "the name, portrait or picture of any author,
composer or artist in connection with his literary, musical or
artistic productions which he has sold or disposed of with such
name, portrait or picture used in connection therewith. '38 Thus,
the privacy statute fails to recognize a fundamental aspect of
moral right-that certain rights stemming from the paternity
and integrity interests survive the grant of the right to use the
work. Resort to the common law right of privacy39 in an effort
to approximate moral right generally has proved unavailing.
4'
The common law right to control one's publicity is similarly lim-
ited: it is not generally recognized, 41 it probably will not afford
protection to the inchoate reputation of the beginning artist,
and it may not prevail unless a competitor has "passed off" his
work as that of the artist.
42
3. Copyright
Finally, it has been suggested 43 that the law of copyright
might vindicate the author's integrity interest. On this view, the
right to copy is read to permit the making only of accurate
copies; hence, garbling by the author's- licensee would amount
to an infringement of the copyright. One commentator has
written:
38 N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, § 51 (McKinney 1948). Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), vacated and remanded per curiam, 393 F.2d 91
(2d Cir. 1968); cf. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67,
80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. CL 1948), aff'd mein., 275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949).
19 Such a right is definitely recognized in twenty-four states, and is viewed favorably
in seven other states and the District of Columbia. See 1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 3.3, at 57-60 (3d ed. 1967)
(collecting cases).
40 See, e.g., Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J.
COMP. L. 487, 501 (1968). See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 398-401
(1960).
4 See Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 218-23 (1954).
42 See Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (right
of publicity not infringed when defendant imitated plaintiff's voice but did not use
her name); Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337 N.Y.2d 949 (Sup.
CL 1972) (interest in free dissemination of ideas presented at press conference su-
persedes speaker's right to control publicity, absent attempt to pass off record of press
conference as speaker's artistic performance). Without questioning the correctness
of these decisions, it is suggested that the current expansive reading given § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act could have provided limited equitable relief-by ordering fuller dis-
closure of the source of the material-without impairing the countervailing values of free
imitation and dissemination of information. See generally text accompanying notes 73-82
infra. On the "right of publicity" in the context of artists' moral rights, see Comment,
Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American
Legal Doctrines, 60 CEO. L.J. 1539, 1548-50 (1972).
43See An Author's Right, 24 IRISH L.T. 225 (1890).
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This rationale is hardly satisfying; it would give rights
accruing only to the owner of the copyright who may
or may not be the creator; it would protect only copy-
righted works and would expire with the copyright.
The moral right protects the creator's personality. This
was never the intent of the copyright statute.44
In short, neither copyright law,45 the right of privacy, nor libel
law provides comprehensive protection of the artist's moral
rights.
46
II. SECTION 43(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT AS A
VINDICATOR OF THE RIGHT To MAINTAIN THE
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF ONE'S WORK
A. The Common Law Background
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a federal stat-
utory supplement to the related common law torts of unfair
competition 47 and misappropriation.48 The doctrine of unfair
competition has long been applied to remedy the deceptive
"passing off" of one's own product as that of one's competitor.49
Although it may be incautious to generalize about the reach of
the common law tort,t1 unfair competition claims brought in
order to approximate authors' rights have often failed because
the tort has been held to encompass deceptive "passing off" but
not simple misrepresentation of one's own product.51 When a
4' Roeder, supra note 16, at 566.
4 See 1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 110.2, at 443-44 (1967 ed.).
4' But cf. Strauss, supra note 20, at 128-42. (American law offers protection dur-
ing the period of artistic creation comparable to that offered by droit moral); Treece,
supra note 40, at 505 (same).
"See generally Callmann, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 COLUM. L. REV.
876, 885-86 (1948).
11 The view that misappropriation of a competitor's business values, not indepen-
dently protected by contract, copyright, or trademark, is a distinct type of unfair com-
petition originated in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
For an extensive discussion of this case, see 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 60-60.3 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1976).
" See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Saalfield Publish-
ing Co. v. Merriam Co., 238 F. I (6th Cir. 1917); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Straus, 136
F. 477 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904); Estes v. Williams, 21 F. 189 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); Fisher v.
Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921); Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige Ch. 75, 34 Am.
Dec. 371 (N.Y. 1840); Landa v. Greenburg, 24 T.L.R. 441 (Ch. 1908).
50 Judge Learned Hand reflected that "there is no part of the law which is more
plastic than unfair competition, and what was not reckoned an actionable wrong 25
years ago may have become such today." Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d
603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
" This limitation was established by the landmark decision in American Wash-
board Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900), criticized in Handler, False
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competitor has engaged in "upsidedown passing off"52 by tak-
ing another's product and selling it as his or her own, the injured
party may have recourse to an action for misappropriation.
53
Such an action is by definition unavailable, however, when the
complaining party has licensed the competitor to distribute or
otherwise exploit the work in question. 54 Thus, the broadcasts
complained of in Gilliam do not appear to give rise to an action
either for common law unfair competition or for misappropria-
tion, as ABC neither "passed off" its own product as the work of
Monty Python 55 nor misappropriated Monty Python's product
56
and represented it as the work of ABC.
B. Statutory Construction
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has received an increas-
ingly broad interpretation in the courts, and its use to approx-
imate moral rights is well founded. Although the legislative
history of this section gives no indication that Congress was con-
cerned with the rights claimed by Monty Python in Gilliam,57
section 43(a) significantly altered the prior law. Where the
and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22, 34-37 (1929). For a discussion of the current
status of this decision, see 1 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 18.1 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1976).
52 Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. Rav. 1289, 1310 (1940).
53E.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); Asso-
ciated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds,
299 U.S. 269 (1936); Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Davis, 215 F. 349 (6th Cir. 1914); Pittsburgh
Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Goldstein v.
Garlick, 65 Misc. 2d 538, 318 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See also Schecter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1935) (Hughes, C.J.).
14 In those cases in which the competitor's actions violate express or implied terms
of the contract between the parties, or infringe upon the complaining party's copyright
or trademark, there will be no need to rely upon the tort claim for misappropriation.
55 ABC's broadcast of the Monty Python "special" resembles "passing off" in at
least one respect: the plaintiff lost a measure of control over his reputation as a result of
the public association of his name with the defendant's goods. On the other hand, the
"passing off" cases generally involve two distinct products, and one could well have con-
cluded here that the edited "special" was actually the same product released by Monty
Python, despite the contested alterations made by ABC. One important advantage of a
§ 43(a) claim over an unfair competition claim is that the plaintiff need not show that
the defendant engaged in "passing off."
56 It was undisputed that ABC owned broadcast rights in the original 30-minute
programs, and thus any claim by Monty Python of misappropriation would fail.
57 The principal purposes of the Lanham Act were (1) to carry out the United
States' treaty obligations by providing trademark protection for Latin American firms
trading in the United States, and (2) to modernize and expand the scheme of trademark
protection. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in [1946] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. 1274, 1276. According to Professor Derenberg, the scope of § 43(a)
was intended to be coextensive with the rights afforded by the Inter-American Trade-
mark Convention. Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade
of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1029, 1039 (1951).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:611
original statute created a cause of action to redress a "false de-
scription of origin," the new section added, in 1946, a broad
additional ground of liability: "any false description or repre-
sentation" now gives rise to an action under section 43(a).
58
During thirty years of judicial interpretation, this section has
evolved from a remedy limited to actual "passing off"59 to a
remedy addressed to any deceptive misdescription of one's own
product, such that a competitor may be deprived of a portion
of the market share that he enjoys.
60
The decision of the Third Circuit in L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc.
v. Lana Lobell, Inc.6 1 established that "passing off," an essential
element of the unfair competition action at common law, 62 is
not an essential element of an action under section 43(a). Broad-
ly speaking, section 43(a) applies to false advertising, and "pass-
ing off" one's product as that of a competitor is but one species
of the generic tort.63 The Gilliam court perceived that, although
ABC had not "passed off" its own product as a Monty Python
product, Monty Python had presented a model section 43(a)
case,6 4 in that ABC had misidentified the origin of its "own"
5' Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act replaced § 3 of the Act of Mar. 19, 1920, Pub.
L. No. 163, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 534.
'9 This limitation was established in Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc.,
87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950),followed in Cham-
berlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951).
6See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546
(2d Cir. 1956) (Clark, J., concurring); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214
F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954); Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill.
1974); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd sub nom. S.C. John-
son & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829
(1956); cf. Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970) (§ 43(a) of Lanham Act proscribes injurious misrepresenta-
tion of defendant's, but not plaintiff's, product).
61 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954).
62 See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
63 See, e.g., Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act:
You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 64 TRADEMARK RysP. 193, 194-97 (1974).
The author also poses several arguments against an expansive reading of § 43(a); all are
inapposite to the Gilliam case. Id. 215.
64 In Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
the court set out the elements of a § 43(a) claim: (1) defendant perpetrated false de-
scriptions respecting his product, (2) such misrepresentation deceived or was likely to
deceive a substantial portion of the audience, (3) such misrepresentation was material,
i.e., was likely to influence consumer decisions, (4) defendant placed his product in in-
terstate commerce, and (5) plaintiff was damaged by diversion of sales occasioned by
defendant's misrepresentation concerning his own goods, or by loss of goodwill be-
cause defendant "passed off" his goods as plaintiff's. None of these elements appear to
preclude Monty Python's success on the merits of its § 43(a) claim.
The courts have rejected several possible defenses that might be urged on behalf
of ABC. Thus, § 43(a) is not limited to competitive abuse of registered trademarks.
See, e.g., Mortellito v. Nina of California, 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Al-
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product.65 The court correctly assumed, without discussion or
citation of authority, that improvident editing of an author's
work, even by one licensed to use the work, can amount to a
misidentification of origin under section 43(a) when the edited
work is attributed to the author.
66
This result illustrates the link between two aspects of droit
moral: Gilliam held that the right to insist on the integrity of one's
work may be enforced through the section 43(a) paternity right
-the right to be free from false attribution of authorship.
67
though misrepresentation as to the geographical origin of goods was early recognized
as common law unfair competition, the term "origin" in the statute has not been re-
stricted to geographical origin. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d
405, 408-09 (6th Cir. 1963); Franklin Mint, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 331 F. Supp.
827, 831-32 (E.D. Pa. 1971); PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp.
106, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (citing cases). That publications and the like are "goods or
services" under the Act was established in Glenn v. Advertising Publications, Inc., 251
F. Supp. 889, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Finally, § 43(a) does not require actual commercial
"competition" between plaintiff and defendant. See Matsushita Elec. Corp. v. Solar
Sound Sys., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); National Lampoon, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir. 1974);
Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Marshall v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 828 (D. Md. 1959). But see Booth v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (dismissing § 43(a) claim were plain-
tiff actress could not show "competition" between herself and defendant advertiser who
imitated her voice in a commercial).
6' Three recent district court decisions lend support to the Second Circuit's ap-
plication of § 43(a) in Gilliam. In Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582
(S.D.N.Y.), vacated and remanded per curiam, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968), defendant had
distributed an old sound recording on which plaintiff, well-known guitarist Jimi Hend-
rix, had performed as a background accompanist; defendant labelled the recording as
if Hendrix were the featured performer. The court held that § 43(a) applied, although
the case involved only one work rather than one work "passed off" as a second work,
and issued a preliminary injunction. Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), also involved a single work that the artist's licensee misrepresented. The court
enjoined under § 43(a) defendants distribution of old sound recordings made by plain-
tiff in covers bearing a current photograph of plaintiff; defendant thereby misrepre-
sented that these recordings contained material recently recorded by plaintiff. And in
Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in which
plaintiff scriptwriter-director complained of the distributor's extensive editing of his
motion picture, Judge Frankel wrote: "It is at least arguable that there is a claim under
[§ 43(a)] in the charge that defendant represents to the public that what the plaintiff
had nothing to do with is the plaintiff's product." Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
66 Cf. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1952) (common law unfair com-
petition made out where defendant record distributor released edited versions of re-
cordings licensed to him and attributed them to plaintiff, in compliance with contract)
(alternative holding). See also note 65 supra.
67 The notion that the integrity and the paternity interests are two sides of the
same coin is not novel. See, e.g., Roeder, supra note 16, at 565-72. A suggested connec-
tion between the two interests may be found in the Gilliam court's statement of the
§ 43(a) claim:
It also seems likely that appellants will succeed on the theory that, re-
gardless of the right ABC had to broadcast an edited program, the cuts made
constituted an actionable mutilation of Monty Python's work. This cause of
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These two rights will not always coincide. An act that violates
the author's integrity right may entail no false description and
thus not be remediable through the (statutory) paternity right.
Conversely, a false description may be actionable under the
paternity right implicit in section 43(a) although the author's
integrity right has not been impaired. When the two rights do
coincide, however-when, for example, a work is edited so ex-
tensively that its attribution to the author becomes a false de-
scription of its origin-section 43(a) provides a vehicle for en-
forcement of the integrity right.
In short, although the moral right to remedy the "gar-
bling" of one's work is not identical with the section 43(a) right
to be free from misattribution and misrepresentation, the anal-
ogy is close enough to justify the Gilliam court's reading of the
statute. A nineteenth-century English court recognized a similar
analogy and held that "garbling" of an author's work was close
enough to "passing off" one's own work as that of the author
to give rise to a common law unfair competition action. Defen-
dant had made abridgments and errors in publishing a revised
edition of plaintiff's law treatise, and the court, noting that
plaintiff could recover only upon proof that the revised edition
had been attributed to him, wrote:
The nearest resemblance to the present case seems to
me to be furnished by those cases in which a person,
having a reputation for the manufacture of a particu-
lar commodity, but not protected by a patent, brings an
action against another for selling an inferior article in
his name. The cases are not exactly alike: there the
sale of the commodity is affected, here the character of
the author. But they bear a close analogy to each other;
and, as at present advised, I cannot say that this action
is not maintainable.
68
action, which seeks redress for deformation of an artist's work, finds its roots
in the continental concept of droit moral, or moral right, which may generally
be summarized as including the right of the artist to have his work attributed to him
in the form in which he created it.
538 F.2d at 23-24 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Judge Frank, concurring in Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952), collapsed
the two interests into one, and cited the celebrated case involving Lord Byron to support
the proposition that an author may enjoin publication of a "garbled version" of his
work. Id. at 589 & n.7. The citation is inappropriate, however, because Byron v. John-
ston, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (Ch. 1816), involved the publication under Byron's name of
poems written by another; misattribution, rather than mutilation, was the offending
aspect of defendant's action.
8 Archbold v. Sweet, 174 Eng. Rep. 55, 56 (K.B. 1832).
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Gilliam similarly held, in the context of the Lanham Act, that
an artist whose work is "not protected by a patent" or copyright
-that is, one who has licensed (or failed to perfect) his exclusive
right to exploit the work-retains the right to vindicate his in-
tegrity interest.
The court somewhat hesitantly found support for its hold-
ing in Autry v. Republic Productions.6 9 Such reliance was mis-
placed. Plaintiff there sought to enjoin the television broadcast
of edited motion pictures in which he had appeared, and urged
that the use of those films in close proximity to television com-
mercials amounted to both a breach of contract and unfair com-
petition under section 43(a). The district court had noted that
plaintiff had transferred to defendant without restriction all
rights in the motion pictures, and gave judgment for the de-
fendant, apparently taking the position that defendant's ex-
ercise of a contractual right conveyed by plaintiff could not
amount to unfair competition. 70 The Ninth Circuit modified
the district court's judgment, indicating that if defendant's edit-
ing was to "so alter or emasculate the motion pictures as to
render them substantially different from the product which
[plaintiff] produced," the section 43(a) question would be pre-
sented; though expressing no view on the merits, the court dis-
approved as dictum that portion of the judgment "which could
be considered authority for such possible abuse."''1 Thus, Autry
is consistent with the result reached in Gilliam-that an artist's
right to object to the abuse of his work survives the grant of a
license in that work-but is only inferentially supportive of that
result.7
1
C. Relief Pending Trial on the Merits
Judge Gurfein's concurring opinion in Gilliam suggested
that equitable relief short of a preliminary injunction-such as
broadcast of the Monty Python disclaimer that Judge Lasker
had approved 3-would be appropriate:
With such a legend, there is no conceivable violation
of the Lanham Act. If plaintiffs complain that their
artistic integrity is still compromised by the distorted
version, their claim does not lie under the Lanham Act,
69 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 858 (1954).
70 Autry v. Republic Prods., 104 F. Supp. 918, 924-25 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (semble).
71 213 F.2d at 670.
72 The result reached in Gilliam is consistent with droit moral. See text accompany-
ing notes 83-97 infra.
73 See Appeal Record, supra note 6, at 117a.
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which does not protect the copyrighted work itself but
protects only against the misdescription or mislabelling.
So long as it is made clear that the ABC version
is not approved by the Monty Python group, there is
no misdescription of origin.
7 4
In all likelihood, Judge Lumbard would agree with this
position as far as it goes: if a practical and fully effective dis-
claimer could be devised, the inclusion of such a legend in the
broadcast program would abate the section 43(a) claim. This
position draws support from the district court opinion in Geisel
v. Poynter Products, Inc. 75 The defendant in Geisel had purchased
numerous drawings executed by plaintiff under the pseudonym
"Dr. Seuss," and later entered the toy market with dolls resem-
bling characters from plaintiff's cartoons that were advertised
as being "From the Wonderful World of Dr. Seuss." Geisel
brought an action under section 43(a) and New York law, seek-
ing permanently to enjoin defendant "from using the name 'Dr.
Seuss' in any manner without plaintiff's consent. '7 6 Defendant
Poynter, pursuant to a preliminary injunction, amended its
advertising to read: "Toys Created, Designed & Produced Ex-
clusively by Don Poynter . . . Based on . . . illustrations by Dr.
Seuss, '' 71 and at trial the court found that the reworded adver-
tisement was not actionable under section 43(a), because it con-
tained no "false designation of origin" and no "false description
or representation.
78
Other considerations, however, suggest that a disclaimer
would be an inappropriate remedy in Gilliam. First, preliminary
injunctive relief has most often been denied in cases in which
the alleged Lanham Act violation led to confusion between sim-
ilar products distributed by commercial rivals, and the courts
have emphasized the countervailing values that such cases pre-
sent. In Societe Comptoir de L'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements
Boussac v. Alexander's Department Stores, Inc.,9 for example, the
Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction
against defendant's truthful advertisement of its dresses as
copies of Christian Dior originals, and stated: "The interest of
the consumer here in competitive prices of garments using Dior
71 538 F.2d at 27.
" 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
7 6 
Id.
7" Id. at 349.
78 Id. at 353; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
79 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
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designs without deception as to origin, is at least as great as the
interest of the plaintiffs in monopolizing the name. '8 0 When, as
in Gilliam, the injury lies in the distortion of a single work by
one licensed to distribute it, countervailing values such as com-
petitive pricing and nondeceptive imitation 81 are not present
and therefore would not be compromised by a grant of prelim-
inary injunctive relief. Furthermore, the limited remedy that
Judge Gurfein commended-the inclusion in future broadcasts
of a notice that Monty Python objected to ABC's editing-would
make it difficult for the viewer to form an impression of the
merit of the group's work. The edited "special" without any
disclaimer is arguably closer to the truth than the "special" con-
taining a disclaimer, as the latter may suggest that ABC deter-
mined the content of the programs to a greater extent than it
actually did.
Finally, as the majority stated in response to Judge Gur-
fein's discussion of remedies:
We are doubtful that a few words could erase the in-
delible impression that is made by a television broad-
cast, especially since the viewer has no means of com-
paring the truncated version with the complete work in
order to determine for himself the talents of plaintiffs.
Furthermore, a disclaimer such as the one originally
suggested by Judge Lasker in the exigencies of an im-
pending broadcast last December, would go unnoticed
by viewers who tuned into the broadcast a few minutes
after it began.
We therefore conclude that Judge Gurfein's pro-
posal that the district court could find some form of
disclaimer would be sufficient might not provide ap-
propriate relief.
8 2
III. MORAL RIGHT IN GILLIAM
The Gilliam court's conclusion in part I of its opinion that
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their copyright
I0 /d. at 37.
* For a discussion of the policy of permitting free imitation, see Booth v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 345-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
2 538 F.2d at 25 n.13. The court appears to have been persuaded by the plaintiffs'
argument that relief such as a disclaimer or prefatory legend would be too unwieldy to
administer, as well as insufficient to abate the deception. In particular, plaintiffs sug-
gested that the additional deceptive effect of prebroadcast publicity would have to be
taken into account in assessing the adequacy of a proposed disclaimer. Reply Brief for
Plaintiff at 13.
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infringement claim was a sufficient ground for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction. As Judge Gurfein noted in his con-
currence, "There [was] literally no need to discuss whether
plaintiffs also have a claim for relief under the Lanham Act
.... -83 That the court nonetheless proceeded to consider the Lan-
ham Act claim, an alternative ground for its disposition of the
case, is of some significance. Not only did the court recognize
that Monty Python's section 43(a) claim "finds its roots in the
continental concept of droit moral, or moral right, 's 4 but also it
appears that the court sought to use the persuasive force of
droit moral as further support for its resolution of the plaintiffs'
copyright claim.8 5 In fact, part I of the court's opinion is subtly
propped at decisive points with adumbrations of droit moral.
A. The Infringement Holding
Judge Lumbard began his analysis of the copyright claim
by affirming that the half-hour Monty Python programs re-
corded by BBC are derivative works 6 based on the scripts in
which Monty Python unquestionably holds the copyright. "Since
the copyright in the underlying script survives intact despite
the incorporation of that work into a derivative work, one who
uses the script, even with - the permission of the proprietor of
the derivative work, may infringe the underlying copyright.
87
He then considered the cases in which one licensed to use the
underlying work in the production of a derivative work was
held to have infringed the underlying copyright by transgress-
ing limitations contained in the license. After finding that most
of these cases involved the unauthorized use of the underlying
work in a different medium or beyond the expiration of the
license, Judge Lumbard continued:
83 538 F.2d at 26. Monty Python strongly pressed the Lanham Act claim. Brief for
Plaintiff at 26-31; Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 12-14. ABC, somewhat surprisingly, did
not dispute the applicability of § 43(a) to the "garbling" of plaintiffs' work, but instead
presented contract and copyright arguments in support of its right to edit the plaintiffs'
programs. Brief for Defendant at 16-31.
84 538 F.2d at 24.
85 This position is also borne out by the following passage from part 1 of the court's
opinion:
Our resolution of these technical arguments serves to reinforce our initial
inclination that the copyright law should be used to recognize the important
role of the artist in our society and the need to encourage production and
dissemination of artistic works by providing adequate legal protection for one
who submits his work to the public.
Id. at 23.
86 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1970).
87 538 F.2d at 20 (citation omitted).
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The rationale for finding infringement when a
licensee exceeds time or media restrictions on his license
-the need to allow the proprietor of the underlying
copyright to control the method in which his work is
presented to the public-applies equally to the situa-
tion in which a licensee makes an unauthorized use of
the underlying work by publishing it in a truncated
version. Whether intended to allow greater economic
exploitation of the work, as in the media and time
cases, or to ensure that the copyright proprietor re-
tains a veto power over revisions desired for the de-
rivative work, the ability of the copyright holder to con-
trol his work remains paramount in our copyright law.
We find, therefore, that unauthorized editing of the
underlying work, if proven, would constitute an in-
fringement of the copyright in that work similar to any
other use of a work that exceeded the license granted
by the proprietor of the copyright.
88
The value that the court attempted to further here-ensuring
"that the copyright proprietor retains a veto power over revi-
sions"-is an important aspect of the artist's integrity interest
protected by droit moral.89 Moreover, the dichotomy that the
court set up between economic exploitation in the media and
time cases, on the one hand, and artist control in the unautho-
rized editing situation, on the other hand, suggests that the
court may have been expanding the range of infringing uses in
order to vindicate the integrity interest. For, as Professor Nim-
mer indicates, "The primary purpose of copyright is not to re-
ward the author, but is rather to secure 'the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.' "90
After holding that editing not authorized by Monty Python's
license to BBC would infringe the group's copyright whether
or not purportedly authorized by BBC or Time-Life Films,
Judge Lumbard proceeded to consider the terms of Monty
Python's contract with BBC. He easily found for the plaintiffs:
"Since the scriptwriters' agreement explicitly retains for the
group all rights not granted by the contract, omission of any
terms concerning alterations in the programs after recording
88 Id. at 21.
'9 See, e.g., Sarraute, supra note 17, at 480-83.
90 1 M. NNItMER, COPYRIGHT § 3.1, at 6.6 (1963) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)); see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 95 S. Ct. 2040,
2044 (1975).
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must be read as reserving to appellants exclusive authority for
such revisions."' The court here overlooked a fact conceded by
plaintiffs-the scriptwriters' agreement reserved to Monty
Python all rights in the script.92 Despite the court's assertion that
"[t]he scriptwriters' agreement, of course, concerns the recorded
program as well as the script," 93 there appears to be no basis for
construing the reservation clause to apply to the recorded pro-
grams. Defendants urged the court to follow McGuire v. United
Artists Television Productions, Inc.,94 in which a writer-director
sought damages for the broadcast, with interruptions for com-
mercial messages, of an edited version of the film that defen-
dant had retained him to produce. The McGuire court rendered
judgment for the defendant on the theory that, inasmuch as the
contract was silent as to whether McGuire retained, in the in-
dustry jargon, any "creative control"95 over the film after he
submitted the finished product, the agreement would be gov-
erned by the ordinary meaning of that term. Because the court
viewed the term as synonymous with "control of the creation,"
it held that absent any contractual language, a producer's "cre-
ative control" ended when the film was ready to be distributed
for exhibition.
96
Judge Lumbard distinguished McGuire on the ground that
there the contract indicated the lack of an agreement on the
scope of "creative control." "Here, however, that scope is clearly
delineated by the agreement that retains for appellants those
rights not granted to BBC, and hence, to BBC's licensees. '' 97 As
indicated earlier, however, the reservation clause was limited
to plaintiffs' scripts. In short, the court could have followed
McGuire by finding that "creative control" was still a widely used
term in the industry and that Monty Python's agreement with
BBC, however detailed it was as to some points, was silent on the
question of "creative control" over the licensed, recorded pro-
grams. It appears that the court viewed the agreement in the
context of droit moral rather than in the context of the television
industry, and it therefore found that plaintiffs had reserved all
rights to edit the recorded programs. This result was as incon-
sistent with ABC's expectations as it was consistent with those of
Monty Python.
" 538 F.2d at 22 (footnote omitted).
92 Brief for Plaintiff at II (emphasis supplied); see Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 5.
9 538 F.2d at 22 n.6.
'4 254 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
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B. The Limitation
After concluding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on
their copyright claim, the court qualified its holding that unau-
thorized editing of a derivative work infringes the copyright in
the underlying work:
[W]e need not accept appellants' assertion that any
editing whatsoever would constitute infringement.
Courts have recognized that licensees are entitled to
some small degree of latitude in arranging the licensed
work for presentation to the public in a manner con-
sistent with the licensee's style or standards. That priv-
ilege, however, does not extend to the degree of edit-
ing that occurred here especially in light of contractual
provisions that limited the right to edit Monty Python
material. 98
The larger holding on unauthorized editing can be viewed as
grounded in a presumption that, when the contract is silent, the
artist did not intend to permit editing by the licensee. As in-
dicated above, the court's stated rationale for the holding re-
veals a sensitivity to the artist's integrity interest. The qualifica-
tion that the court added was grounded in necessity. Often, the
licensee will be unable to reproduce the artist's work exactly, as
when a motion picture is based on a novel; in such a case the
licensee should not be subjected to an infringement action when
the deviation from the original work is minor and the contract
imposes no requirement of fidelity to the original work. Even
when exact reproduction is possible, as in the case of publication
rights in a manuscript, the unqualified presumption that the
parties intended to permit no editing whatever would be unre-
alistic and would also expose the licensee to liability for "tech-
nical" infringements. This result appears unnecessarily harsh
when the artist has failed to include in the contract any terms
governing proposed modifications of his work.
Although the court's qualification appears to be sound as
a matter of policy, its relation to the prior case law is trouble-
some. As authority for the proposition that "licensees are en-
titled to some small degree of latitude in arranging the licensed
work," 99 the court cited Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp.' ° and
"8 Id. at 23 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
9 9
Id.
"' 357 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp. ," neither of which supports
this broad language. In Stratchborneo, plaintiff alleged that cer-
tain popular recordings, including one by Jimmy Smith, in-
fringed her copyright in a musical composition. The court re-
jected this claim, in part on the ground that Jimmy Smith's
recording was based on a Preston Foster composition, and
noted that Smith, who had obtained a compulsory license from
Foster, had "the right so to alter [the] copyrighted work to suit
his own style and interpretation."'1 2 (The Stratchborneo court
had the benefit of a decision by the Second Circuit holding that
a copyright owner's rights" 3 to "make any other version" of a
musical composition and to "arrange or adapt" that work are
not applicable to phonograph records," 4 because they are not
"copies" within the meaning of the copyright statute, and thus
these rights do not limit the rights of a compulsory licensee." 5)
Even if the rule is sound, 1'1 6 its extension beyond the realm of
sound recordings is not obviously correct, and the Gilliam court's
use of the Stratchborneo case to illustrate a general rule is ques-
tionable.
Different problems are presented by the citation of Pre-
minger in support of the general rule that a licensee has "some
small degree of latitude" to adapt a copyrighted work. In Pre-
minger, the producer of a motion picture sought to enjoin its
exhibition on television in edited form and with commercial in-
terruptions. The court held that, inasmuch as the contract gov-
erning the production and exhibition of the film was silent as to
editing for television, "the parties will be deemed to have
adopted the custom prevailing in the trade or industry. '' 1°7 Be-
cause the proposed editing and the commercial interruptions
appeared to fall within established industry custom, injunctive
relief was denied. Preminger, therefore, does not support a gen-
eral rule that a licensee may edit a work, but rather only the rule
that when the contract is silent on this question, a court will
101 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 25 App. Div. 830, 269
N.Y.S.2d 913, aff'd mnem., 18 N.Y.2d 659, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1966).
102 357 F. Supp. at 1405.
13 See 17 U.S.C. § l(b) (1970).
104 See Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 687 (1941).
"I3 See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Foullon, 79 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1948),
aff'd, 171 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1949). This decision is questioned in 1 M. NIMMER, COPY-
RIGHT §§ 105.52, 108.4612 (1967 ed.).
1" The general revision of the copyright law incorporated this rule into the com-
pulsory license provisions of Title 17. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 115(a)(2),
90 Stat. 2541, 2561.
107 49 Misc. 2d at 366, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
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defer to industry practice in interpreting the scope of altera-
tion permitted by a license.
The Gilliam court's use of Stratchborneo and Preminger a-
overlooked the fact that some copyright licenses plainly con-
template that the licensee will transfer the artist's work to a dif-
ferent medium. Thus, in Preminger, the plaintiff had licensed
Columbia Pictures to exhibit the motion picture "Anatomy of a
Murder" on television. In Gilliam, on the other hand, plaintiffs
had licensed the exhibition on American television of programs
recorded for British television. As Judge Lasker stated at the
evidentiary hearing on plaintiff's application,'"8 the need for
editing is clearer in a case that involves a transfer of medium.
The distinction is recognized in the droit moral jurisdictions, and
the licensee's need to adapt in order to achieve a transfer of
medium takes precedence over the author's integi-ity interest. 0 9
The adapter is viewed, moreover, as "the author of a work which
purports to be equally original." 10 A number of cases in this
country also recognize, in the absence of any contractual provi-
sion, the adapter's right to edit.-" The Gilliam court's brief dis-
cussion of the rights of licensees suggests that it was prepared
to recognize a right to edit even when adaptation is unnecessary,
as when a publisher is licensed to distribute an author's manu-
script in book form. Although this approach avoided the dif-
ficult question whether the move from British noncommercial
television to American commercial television was a transfer of
medium, it accomplished little else. Indeed, the court's remarks,
though clearly dicta, contrasted sharply with the overall tone of
the opinion, which was strongly sympathetic to the interests of
artists and authors.
108 1 find a distinct difference between the Preminger case and this case in that
the Preminger case involved a vehicle which was made as a regular production
movie to be shown in a movie house and it was reasonable it seemed to me to
assume that if you sold that for television you are going to have to do some-
thing to be able to produce it on television, whereas the material that we are
dealing with here, of course, was produced for television and it is consider-
ably less reasonable to assume that there would be further editing.
Appeal Record, supra note 6, at 10la-02a.
109 Strauss, supra note 20, at 124 n.52.
11 Sarraute, supra note 17, at 481.
"'See, e.g., Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 270 Cal. App. 2d 886, 76 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969);
Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 6 Misc. 2d 383, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 1957),
aff'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 475, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960); cf. Curwood v. Affiliated Distribs.,
Inc., 283 F. 219, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (contract permitted film script to "elaborate on"
plaintiff's story).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos. was not the first case
in which an American court invoked droit moral by name, nor in
which an artist succeeded in approximating moral rights under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The decision is noteworthy,
however, both for its recognition that section 43(a) affords a
remedy when a work is "garbled" while being edited for televi-
sion, and for the less obvious influence of droit moral on part I
of the opinion.
It has been predicted that the television industry need not
fear a rash of lawsuits by Hollywood scriptwriters."12 Yet the
Second Circuit, by connecting the right to maintain the integrity
of one's work with the (statutory) paternity right to prevent false
attribution, opened the door for artists to enforce related rights
respecting the editing of their work. In particular, Gilliam un-
derscores the point that an artist's grant of the right to exploit
his work for profit need not divest him of a congeries of non-
economic rights in the work. The availability of a federal cause
of action under section 43(a) also allows the artist to avoid the
limitations inherent in state remedies such as those for unfair
competition and libel.
Perhaps the enduring significance of Gilliam, apart from
its effect on any particular doctrine, lies in its recognition that
the American legal system can accommodate the vigorous as-
sertion of artists' rights.
112 Hertzberg, Onward and Upward with the Arts: Naughty Bits, THE NEw YORKER,
Mar. 29, 1976, at 86.
